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Introduction  
 
Since the 1940s, the United States of America (US) has played a vital role in the security of 
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a small population and a small army and needed the 
Americans to protect the Saudi oil trade during the multiple wars that have raged in the 
Middle East.
1
 The US wanted Saudi Arabia to be a ‘pillar’ in the defence of the Middle East 
against the Soviet threat during the Cold War and they wanted to ensure access to oil across 
the border.
2
 As a result, the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia has an economic 
and military foundation. 
This relation peaked during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, after Iraq had invaded Kuwait on 2 
August 1990. The Americans and Saudis worked very closely during this period. Both the 
Americans and the Saudis feared that Iraq might invade Saudi Arabia and therefore they 
quickly decided to build a coalition, consisting of some 50 countries from both the west and 
the Arab world, for the defence Saudi Arabia.
3
 The immediate following defensive operation 
was called Operation Desert Shield. When Iraq did not retreat from Kuwait, a new offensive 
operation called Desert Storm started on 17 January 1991,
4
 which ousted the Iraqis from 
Kuwait in February 1992 thereby ending the Gulf War of 1990-1991.
5
 
Half a million American troops were stationed in the Saudi kingdom during the Gulf War, 
along with some 1.500 journalists who reported on the war and Saudi society. Many 
Americans at home were shocked to read about the oppression of women in Saudi Arabia and 
started questioning their alliance to the kingdom.
6
  
Likewise, many conservative Saudis opposed the presence of the Americans in their country. 
They felt that the American presence breached the religious prescription that forbade non-
Muslims to enter the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
 
However, other Saudis were thankful 
that the Americans were stationed in Saudi Arabia and that they prevented the Iraqis from 
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occupying the kingdom.
7
 Some liberal Saudis even ceased the opportunity to ask the 
government for liberalisation and more women’s rights. 8 
The relationship between the two countries intensified during the Gulf War, due to the 
military cooperation. However, this cooperation also led to some issues at home, as 
mentioned above. These domestic struggles in both Saudi Arabia and the US influenced 
decisions made by its governments and this changed the relationship between the two 
countries. 
Status Quaestionis 
In the past 27 years, a lot has been written about the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Much of this 
literature focuses on Iraq and the US, although there are also ample books on the Middle East 
during the war and on the coalition. However, there is only limited literature available on 
Saudi Arabia during 1990-1991. Although the country is often mentioned in literature, it is 
usually granted only a couple of pages and sometimes a chapter. The latter is the case in the 
book Saudi Arabia enters the twenty first century: the political, foreign policy, and energy 
dimensions by Anthony Cordesman.
9
  
Books on the history, international relations, military or politics of Saudi Arabia generally 
cover multiple decades or a century and the Gulf War is usually only a small part of the book. 
This is also the case in many books on the US during the Gulf War, which offer little room for 
Saudi Arabia and often focus on the US relations with the coalition or Iraq. 
The books that give a little bit more room to both Saudi Arabia and the US during the Gulf 
War often focus on the international relations between the two countries. They look at 
diplomacy, the coalition, the cooperation between politicians and diplomats and other political 
and military issues. Examples are Rachel Bronson’s Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy 
Partnership with Saudi Arabia
10
 and Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh’s The Gulf 
Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order.
11
 These books, like most 
others, neglect the populations in Saudi Arabia and the US, as well as the media, even though 
these groups all had a big influence on the relationship between the two countries. 
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There is no English research on media and journalism in Saudi Arabia during this period 
available, but there are some articles on the role of the American written media during the 
Gulf War. Most of these articles focus on domestic issues in the media and their effect on the 
war. Few focus on reports on Saudi Arabia and their effects on policy, even though many 
Americans started questioning the American policy toward Saudi Arabia after reading about 
Saudi society in newspapers. The only research on this subject is done by Abdullah Alrebh, 
who wrote a dissertation on the description of Saudi Arabia in The London Times and The 
New York Times, and noticed that journalists often explicitly mentioned the decisions by 
King Fahd as “personal decisions”.12  
There is some literature available/to be found on public opinion in the US during the Gulf 
War. Often, this literature, such as John Mueller’s Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War13 
focusses on domestic issues in the US and the public’s reaction to the war in Iraq, not its 
response to Saudi Arabia or the media. As with literature on media in Saudi Arabia, English 
literature on public opinion during the Gulf War is scarce. 
As there is a gap in research on the influence of the media and public opinion on the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US, this thesis will examine this subject by 
answering the following question: to what extent did the written media and the public opinion 
of the populations of Saudi Arabia and the United States influence the relationship between 
Saudi Arabia and the United States during the Gulf War of 1990-1991? 
Methodology 
The thesis will start with a short overview of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 in chapter 1. The 
chapter will focus on events leading up to, during and shortly after the Gulf War in Iraq, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the US. Special attention is given to the decisions made by the 
governments of Saudi Arabia and the US. The chapter focuses on issues that are relevant for 
this thesis.  
The second chapter will look more closely to the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the 
US during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. In this thesis, the word relationship implies 
international relationship, which means “[t]he way in which two or more nations interact with 
and regard each other, especially in the context of political, economic, or cultural 
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relationships.”14 This chapter will look at the relationship before the war, the economic, 
military, political and cultural interactions between the two countries during the war and how 
their relation has changed as a result of the Gulf War. However, the focus of this chapter will 
be on the political and military leadership of the countries. 
The third chapter will focus on the organisation of Saudi society, as this influences Saudi’s 
domestic policy and was of importance in the security relationship between Saudi Arabia and 
the US. The chapter will look at Saudi opposition to this relationship and the presence of 
American troops in the kingdom, as well as domestic struggles caused by the war and the 
response of the government to these struggles. 
The fourth chapter will look at reasons why the US went to war and its relevance toward 
public opinion of the American population. This chapter will give special attention to the role 
of the American press corps and the manner in which their articles were received in the US. 
The public’s reaction to news on Saudi Arabia and subsequent criticism on the American 
involvement in Saudi Arabia will also be discussed. Lastly, the ‘Highway of death’ and its 
influence on American public opinion will be examined. 
This thesis is a literature review and will use information from relevant literature in order to 
answer the research question. Unfortunately, there are some limitations to this method. This 
thesis is only based on Dutch and English literature, as I do not read Arabic. Therefore, there 
is a gap in used literature, since no original Saudi sources have been treated. The literature is 
often written by American researchers and consists of mainly secondary sources. However, 
also some primary sources such as polls, newspaper articles, speeches and a biography by a 
Saudi general are used. The polls help to measure changes in public opinion during the war, 
while newspaper articles provide examples of how the media shaped public opinion. Speeches 
help to give an indication of the tone and intentions of leaders and the message that they 
wanted to send to the public. The biography of General Khaled ibn Sultan is used because it is 
one of few sources describing the thought process within the Saudi leadership. 
Some sources on Saudi Arabia are written from a western perspective and are biased. While 
doing research, I have tried to avoid such articles when possible or used them with caution.  
Another issue is the lack of English or Dutch literature on Saudi media and journalism. This 
means that this thesis does not examine the influence of Saudi media on the Saudi population.  
One last issue is public opinion. In the US, polls are common and public opinion is often 
measured. This is not the case in Saudi Arabia. Saudi population had during the war more 
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opportunities to express itself and it did so by asking the government for reform. Saudis used 
multiple tools to express their opinion, as will be mentioned in chapter 3. Since it is not 
possible to find ‘the public opinion of the Saudi people’, I will describe the public opinion of 
several large groups and their influence on Saudi policy in the third chapter. 
Despite these limitations, I think that these four chapters will lead up to a satisfactory answer 
to the stated research question. The last part of this thesis will deal with the conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Overview of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 
 
In order to look at the relation between Saudi Arabia and the US during the Gulf War of 
1990-1991, it is important to know which events took place leading up to and during the war. 
The following chapter will look at how the Gulf War started and the responses of Saudi 
Arabia and the US to the war. It will also look at the cooperation between these two countries 
and eventually at how the war ended. 
Lead-up to the Gulf War  
Two years before the Gulf War, the Iran-Iraq War had ended with a ceasefire. This war was 
fought between 1980 and 1988 and had cost Iraq lots of money. Loans from Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia had kept the country from bankruptcy, but now that the war was over, Iraq needed to 
pay back these loans.
15
 Since Iraq had few ways of earning income outside the oil industry 
and oil prices were relatively low at that time, Iraq struggled to pay its debt. Hoping to 
increase the oil price per barrel, President Saddam Hussain of Iraq wanted Kuwait and the 
United Arabic Emirates to lower their oil production, even though the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries had already decided to collectively do so.
16
 When Kuwaiti oil 
production was not cut, Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing oil from a shared oilfield on 15 July 
1990. The Iraqis demanded 2.4 billion dollar from Kuwait to cover for the supposed losses in 
oil revenue and threatened to take military action if Kuwait did not abide. Despite 
international attempts to settle the dispute, Iraq moved its troops to the border with Kuwait on 
24
 
July. In reaction, the US put its military fleet that is stationed in the Persian Gulf on alert.
17
  
Even though Kuwait gave in to the Iraqi demands on 26 July, Iraq moved another 30.000 
soldiers to its border with Kuwait and started demanding border modifications and a grant of 
10 billion dollar.
18
 This movement of troops was noticed by the American military 
intelligence on 30 July, as they saw that some 100.000 Iraqi troops and military material had 
moved to the southern border of Iraq. General Norman Schwarzkopf was summoned to the 
White House to discuss a possible US deployment.
19
 Two days later, Iraq left the negotiations 
with Kuwait in Jeddah.
20
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Up to this moment, Saudi Arabia had lived in peace with Iraq. According to General Khaled 
bin Sultan, the highest military leader in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, the Saudis hoped 
that Iraq’s threats to attack Kuwait could be stopped by efforts of the United Nations (UN), 
the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organisation and hoped Iraq would end the 
conflict peacefully.
21
  
Building a coalition 
unfortunately, things did not go as the Saudis hoped they would. On 2 August 1990, Iraqi 
divisions invaded Kuwait, followed by other units until 140.000 Iraqi troops were stationed in 
Kuwait. Within twelve hours Iraq had managed to take over Kuwait and a division of the 
Republican Guard was marching to Iraq’s border with Saudi Arabia.22 
It was not clear to the Americans whether Iraq was going to invade Saudi Arabia or not, but 
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, told the American government 
that it was important to “plant the American flag in the Saudi desert as soon as possible” in 
order to deter the Iraqis.
23
 As the Americans perceived Saddam Hussain as “Hitler on the 
Euphrates,”24 the American leadership decided that he needed to be stopped. The Americans 
felt that it was important “to get the international community behind us” before acting on the 
Iraqi invasion
25
 and so it was decided to ask the UN Security Council to impose a trade 
embargo and economic sanctions on Iraq. The question was positively answered by the 
Security Council and the sanctions and embargo were imposed.
26
 
According to Saudi General Bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia hoped that the sanctions would work. 
Saudi’s only goal was defending Saudi Arabia, but when it became clear that Iraq would not 
be diverted and the Saudi border and oilfields were endangered, the Saudis collaborated closer 
with the coalition. Saudi Arabia changed its tone as well as its military aims to forcing Iraq 
out of Kuwait, restoring the original government in Kuwait and ensuring Saudi security. 
However, as “remov[ing] the threat from the Kingdom’s security” was the ultimate goal, 
Saudi Arabia still hoped that these war aims could be achieved peacefully, since a war would 
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bring its security at risk.
27
 The coalition had agreed that they would not invade Iraq or force 
Saddam Hussain to step down.
28
  
Also, defending Saudi Arabia would be easier than ousting Hussain from Kuwait. At the 
beginning of August the Pentagon initiated Operation Desert Shield.
29
 Under the leadership of 
the US, a broad international coalition that would perform this operation was built by James 
Baker, the Secretary of State at the time. The coalition involved participants from both the 
West and the Arab world.
30
 Almost 50 countries provided troops or other personnel to the 
Saudi-American side of the conflict, as well as financial support and numerous amounts of 
equipment.
31 
 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Shield 
Operation Desert Shield was the build-up of coalition forces. The operation officially began 
on 7 August 1990 and ended 17 January 1991, when Operation Desert Storm began.
32
 The US 
had already made a rough plan for the defence of Saudi Arabia against Iraq, which lay the 
basis for Operation Desert Shield. This plan included the deployment of 200.000 US troops to 
Saudi Arabia.
33
 
The Americans led the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs know that if the Iraqis had not 
withdrawn from Kuwait before 15 January 1991, the US and the coalition would use force to 
expel the Iraqis. Although the American leadership hoped that the economic sanctions 
imposed by the UN would force Iraq to pull back from Kuwait, they feared an air, land and 
sea battle was necessary. The Americans decided that if Iraq would not collapse under 
sanctions, they would strategically bomb the Baghdad area after the deadline had expired.
34
 
Operation Desert Shield was a defensive operation, but for this stage, an offensive battle plan 
was needed. This plan, named Operation Desert Storm, was made by Colin Powell and 
General Schwarzkopf. This plan entailed destroying Iraq’s military and economic foundations 
by air, followed by a fake attack from the sea in order to lure the Iraqi forces to the Kuwaiti 
coast. The coalition forces would than come in Kuwait from the western desert and surround 
the Iraqi forces that would then be unable to return to Iraq. To pull off this plan, more than the 
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250.000 soldiers already staying in Saudi Arabia were needed and after President H.W. Bush 
had approved the plan on 30 October, the size of the US Army in the kingdom was doubled.
35
  
When Operation Desert Storm started, right after the deadline had expired on 17 January, Iraq 
was unable to do much against the attacks. It tried to bomb cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia, 
but had little success.
36
 In one hundred hours, Kuwait was liberated by the coalition forces 
and victory had been won at a low cost of lives. To avoid another ‘Vietnam War’, an ongoing 
conflict with no end, the Americans and Saudis decided not to chase the fleeing troops into 
Iraq or depose Saddam Hussain.
37
 
Due to its technical nature – high-tech aerial bombardments in combination with an array of 
military equipment, weaponry and vehicles – and its short duration, the war had a low 
casualty rate on the side of the coalition. Good tactics, focused objectives and a clear end goal 
had helped,
38
 as well as the Saudi military infrastructure, the use of the Saudi airspace and the 
good cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the US.
39
 Not just Saudi infrastructure, but also 
its army had contributed to the quick victory. Saudi Arabia provided nearly 50.000 men and 
270 tanks.
40
 In addition, Saudi Arabia had provided assistance to the armies of the coalition 
by monitoring and protecting tankers, using its airborne warning and control systems aircraft 
(AWACS) and F-15’s.41 
Peace 
On 15 February 1991, the Iraqi government stated it would accept a UN Security Council 
resolution calling for peace on the condition that the US Army left the region, certain Kuwaiti 
groups were included in the Kuwaiti government, the end of Israel’s occupation of Palestine 
and the assistance of coalition forces in rebuilding Iraq. President Bush could not accept this 
and on 22 February, he gave the Iraqis an offer with a 24-hour deadline. It contained the 
drawback of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait in one week and eleven other strict conditions. As 
far as the US was concerned, withdrawing Iraqi soldiers would be allowed to leave Kuwait 
unharmed.
42
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In reaction, the Iraqis made their own peace plan along, which contained less strict conditions, 
thus rejecting the American plan. President Bush could not agree to this other plan and despite 
pressure from the international community, decided – along with other western countries – to 
continue with a planned land offensive. This surprise land attack by the coalition forces 
started on 24 February and it completely startled the Iraqis in Kuwait. They tried to flee to 
Iraq, taking as much equipment and troops as possible with them. The Iraqi Minister of 
Defence sent a letter on 26 February to the UN Secretary-General, stating that Iraq was 
willing to accept most of the UN resolutions, with some exceptions. The letter was rejected by 
the permanent five members of the UN Security Council.
43
 
Even though President Bush had been informed that “all military objects had been achieved”, 
he still had allowed the surprise land attack on 24 February. This had been the most excessive 
bombing of Baghdad since the start of the Gulf War. Besides Baghdad, retreating Iraqi 
soldiers were also attacked, on what later is called the ‘Highway to hell’ or ‘Highway of 
death’. By shooting the head and the tail of the column of withdrawing Iraqi soldiers, the 
coalition forces trapped them and killed thousands of fleeing soldiers. This ‘turkey shooting’ 
of Iraqi soldiers shocked the international community and President Bush was forced by the 
military High Command and officials from his government to definitively end the war with 
Iraq. On 3 March 1991, a cease-fire was formally accepted by the coalition members
44
 and a 
month later, on 3 April, the UN Security Council accepted a resolution for a similar formal 
cease-fire. The Iraqis accepted it on 6 April.
45
 
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq left a big impact on the Middle East. The involvement of the 
US protected Saudi Arabia from undergoing the same faith as the Kuwaitis. After a short 
offensive, performed by a coalition of both western and Arab countries under the leadership 
of the US, Kuwait was liberated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43
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2. The Saudi-American relationship during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 
 
Saudi Arabia was not able to defend itself against Iraq during the Gulf War. It has a small 
population and a small army, its territory lacks physical boundaries and a ‘chronic instability’ 
in the region gives the country bad security prospects.
46
 After the Iraqi invasion, the Saudis 
aligned themselves with the Americans, leading to a cooperation that meant the pinnacle for 
the relationship between the two countries.
47
 This chapter will describe how this cooperation 
started, how it worked out and some obstacles that had to be overtaken. 
 
Prior to the invasion 
Saudi Arabia became of interest to the US in the 1930’s, when the latter country decided that 
it would be beneficial to them to have access to oil beyond their borders. Saudi Arabia was an 
obvious choice, as a country with one of the largest oil reserves in the world. The seriousness 
of the American interest in the region is expressed in a declaration in 1943 that states “the 
defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States”.48 Ever since, Saudi 
Arabia has depended on security guarantees from the US, which are essential to their defence 
policy.
49
 
In 1966, President Johnson adopted a policy that called on Saudi Arabia to be responsible – 
along with Iran – for the defence of the region. The containment of the Middle East was an 
important strategy goal of the US in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. The Americans assisted 
Saudi Arabia with a 100 million dollar sale of military material, so the kingdom could secure 
the region. In return, the Americans guaranteed the protection of Saudi Arabia. This deal 
helped strengthen their relationship.
50
 
The presence of oil and the small Saudi population worsened the security prospects for the 
kingdom. Some of Saudi’s neighbours were populous, militaristic countries ruled by 
authoritarian leaders which were able to draft a lot of men into the army. This formed a 
possible threat to Saudi’s national security and therefore the security guarantees from the 
Americans were essential for Saudi Arabia. As many Arabs – both at home and in 
neighbouring states – opposed the Americans. The Saudis downplayed the significance of the 
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military relationship. Some Arab states supported the Soviet Union during the Cold War and 
tried to make the Saudi population rise up against its rulers. The Saudi-American relationship 
was thus partly a result of the threat that Saudi’s neighbours formed, but also increased the 
threat to Saudi domestic security.
51
  
Early days 
After Iraq had invaded Kuwait and it started to seem like the Iraqis planned on marching 
toward Saudi Arabia, on 3 August 1990, the US wanted to react quickly, but they realised that 
they could not act on their own.
52
 They decided that it was unacceptable for them for Iraq to 
gain access to Saudi oil, as Iraq would then own 40% of the world’s oil reserves and have 
significant control over the oil price.
53
 Saudi Arabia had an efficient army, but it was too 
small and inexperienced to be able to withstand the Iraqi army on its own and “[t]here was no 
way that it could cope without American forces”.54 
Thus, President Bush decided that his country should send troops, as long as the Saudis would 
accept the American assistance.
 
He met with the Saudi ambassador to the US and the 
Americans made it clear that their involvement meant a large scale operation, as they feared 
that a symbolic operation would make the situation worse.
55
 To underline his seriousness, 
President Bush declared that “[w]e’re committed to Saudi Arabia” and told the US Army to 
prepare for the defence of Saudi Arabia.
56
 On 8
 
August, the president held an address in which 
he stated “[l]et me be clear, the sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest of 
the United States. This decision, [...] grows out of the long-standing friendship and security 
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.”57  
Although the US had promised to help Saudi Arabia, diplomats from the two countries were 
not very trusting the beginning. The Americans were afraid that Saudi Arabia would give in to 
pressure from Iraq and pay them to stay away from the kingdom, leaving the Kuwaitis to fend 
for themselves. In return, Saudi Arabia feared that the Americans would back out, as the 
Americans had done in Lebanon in 1984. They dreaded that the arrival of the Americans 
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would cause a lot of domestic unrest,
58
 that the Americans would not live up to their promises 
and that they would forsake their support after a symbolic gesture and leave the kingdom to 
protect itself. Another concern for the Saudis was the presence of non-Muslim troops into the 
country that was supposed to be the protector of the two most important Islamic places, as 
they feared that the presence of Western soldiers would defile Mecca and Medina. However, 
they feared that an Iraqi invasion would also defile those places and thus it was decided to 
accept the American help.
59
  
Despite these objections, the Saudis decided to trust the Americans. King Fahd, who was the 
king of Saudi Arabia at the time, had in the past not allowed the US military to build up large 
arsenals or station operators for defence machinery in his country, but with Hussain’s army 
knocking on his door, he changed his mind. When General Schwarzkopf and Secretary of 
Defence Richard Cheney arrived in the kingdom on 6 August showing pictures of the Iraqi 
Army, King Fahd said “[w]e have to do this, (…) [t]he most important thing is to proceed to 
protect our country, together with the Americans.” Two days after, the first American military 
divisions arrived in the kingdom.
60
 After accepting the American help, Saudi Arabia largely 
adhered to the American strategy, and its political and military leadership between mid-
August 1990 and February 1991. The invasion of Kuwait forced Saudi Arabia to openly admit 
its military partnership with the US.
61
 
Cultural sensitivity 
The Americans were very much afraid of insulting the Saudis. They were aware of the 
religious sensitivity of the Saudis and did as much as they could to prevent any problems. 
Despite precautionary measures, American ambassador to Saudi Arabia Charles Freeman has 
admitted that he feared that the American soldiers would insult their hosts by violating the 
cultural and religious rules of the country, bluntly stating he feared for a soldier “inadvertently 
piss[ing] on a mosque”.62 
One precautionary measure was making sure that no Jewish religious services were held on 
Saudi soil, abiding to a request made by the Saudis. Colin Powell made sure that Jewish 
soldiers were flown by helicopter to a ship in international waters.
63
 When Thanksgiving 
arrived, General Schwarzkopf did the same for a Christian ceremony, showing respect and 
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willingness to adept to the regional customs and religion of the host country.
64
 
In return, the Saudis feared insulting the Americans. When the Saudi Army organised a series 
of lectures on Islam, in which its beliefs, rituals and practices were explained to coalition 
troops staying in the kingdom and a number of US soldiers converted to Islam after having 
taken this course, General Bin Sultan did not want this information to be made public, as he 
feared that it could cause some tensions with the Christian members of the coalition.
65
 
Despite these efforts, minor incidents did occur. On one occasion, General Bin Sultan told all 
the Muslim soldiers in the coalition forces that those who wanted were allowed to perform the 
umrah, the smaller pilgrimage to Mecca. General Schwarzkopf told the Saudi general that this 
had upset him, as General Bin Sultan had only mentioned it to soldiers from Muslim countries 
even though there were American Muslim soldiers that wanted to do the umrah as well. In the 
end, the incident bettered the relationship between the generals, as General Bin Sultan was 
glad to hear the American general had remembered to include American Muslims.  
Another minor incident took place when the Saudi general wrote a Christmas greetings to be 
published in the daily news bulletin that was send to American soldiers. It was never 
published because General Schwarzkopf feared that the title of the Saudi general might have 
confused the Americans to think they were under command of General Bin Sultan, which was 
not the case. The Saudi general refused to drop the title, as it was given to him by his king, 
and it was to him a matter of “our national pride, our post-war stability, our need to justify our 
policies to Arab opinion”. The Saudis deemed it very important that the Americans were not 
seen as an occupying force. General Bin Sultan also noted that he “trust[ed] that history will 
also record that our relationship with the United States was strengthened and deepened by the 
respect and understanding we extended to each other throughout the crisis.”66 
Post-Gulf War struggles 
Prior to the Gulf War, the Americans wanted to obtain basing rights in Saudi Arabia in order 
to have a permanent army stronghold on the Arabian Peninsula. The Saudis had always 
denied them this right, mainly because they did not want to focus too much attention on their 
military relationship with the Americans.
 
 
In late November 1990, King Fahd stated that the US still did not have any permanent basing 
rights in the country. After the war, Minister of Defence Prince Sultan said that the US had to 
withdraw their troops as soon as the mission had ended. In September 1991, he denounced the 
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way that the US had used Saudi Arabia as ”a military staging area against Iraq and urged 
Washington to spread its deployments out to Kuwait and even to capture an airfield in Iraq 
itself to use as a base.” The Saudis still did not want to provide the Americans with basing 
rights, but American military personnel and equipment were allowed to stay behind.  
Saudi Arabia was one of the few countries in the region that did not work out defence 
agreements with the US.
67
 Despite not having any official agreement, US troops have always 
been stationed in Saudi Arabia since the start of the Gulf War. After the war was over and 
most of the US Army left, 5.000 troops stayed in Saudi Arabia as a symbol of US support to 
the Saudi monarchy.
68
 In 1994, there were still sixty American airplanes stationed in Saudi 
Arabia
69
 and currently, there are still five US military bases operating in the country.
70
    
As Operation Desert Shield was taking shape, the Americans realised that if they were to 
provide the bulk of the troops, they were also likely to suffer the most losses and they felt that 
they should be compensated for it. James Baker said: “American blood will be spilled. If you 
think we’re not going to ask the Saudis to pay for this, you’ve got another think coming.” 
King Fahd agreed and said: “Money is worth much less than lives. (…) How can you put a 
dollar value on people’s lives who are fighting? Your requests will be met.”71At the end of the 
war, the number of American casualties ranged from 376
72
 to 148 American deaths, 
depending on the source.
73
 Few of the coalition members receiving copious amounts of 
money seemed to consider that Saudi Arabia did not have an endless bank account. However, 
the US ambassador Charles Freedman had considered that Saudi Arabia did not have 
unending piles of money and feared that if Saudi Arabia would be left behind with little to 
spend after the war had ended, it would cause resentment toward the US, which did happen in 
the end.
74
 
The Gulf War had cost Saudi Arabia 60 billion dollar, of which most went to its coalition 
partners,
75
 leaving the kingdom with a budget deficit until 1999.
76
 Most of the money spent on 
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the war went to the US to cover for their costs and compensate for their losses.
77
 Saudi Arabia 
bought arms from American manufacturers for more than 25 billion dollar between the 
beginning and the end of the Gulf War and at the beginning of 1992, there were 407 billion 
dollar worth of direct investments in the US coming from Saudi Arabia. The economies of the 
countries were connected by all this, also because oil prices are denominated in US dollars 
which price depended on the strength of the American economy.
78
 
Just after the end of the Gulf War, most common Saudis were worried about the financial 
problems of their country, the presence of American soldiers and the plans of their 
government to continue the military alliance with the US and the purchase of arms from them. 
They felt it served no purpose to buy arms that their military was unlikely to be able to 
effectively use.
79
 
The US did not realise how serious opposition against the presence of Americans within 
Saudi Arabia was or that many Saudis wanted them gone. The Americans also did not 
recognise the slinking oil wealth and the financial troubles of the kingdom or how this all 
caused domestic tensions. The US kept on pushing Saudi Arabia for US Army bases because 
they wanted a base on the Arabian Peninsula and establish a more visible and meaningful 
military presence in the region. They also hoped that the kingdom would provide more funds 
for their presence, even though they provided limited support to the internal security situation 
of Saudi Arabia.
80
 
After the war, the overall relation between Saudi Arabia and the US was very good, although 
there were some tensions, as mentioned above.
81
 The high debt, the expensive arms sales and 
the connectivity of the oil industry to the American currency all added to a deepening of the 
Saudi-American relationship, as the financial aspect of this relation had gained importance. 
Although the relation between Saudi Arabia and the United States was good during the war, 
this period did result in some tensions. These were mainly caused by opposition from the 
Saudi population due to financial trouble in the country and the continuous demand for basing 
rights by the Americans. 
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3. The public opinion of the Saudi population 
 
The many foreign soldiers stationed in Saudi Arabia during the war caused much friction for 
the Saudi government and led to a bigger engagement in politics by Saudis. The Gulf War 
meant the emergence of a more politically active Saudi population, with an interest for 
politics at home and abroad. This newly found criticism led to the challenging of the Saudi 
leadership.
82
  
This chapter will discuss Saudi society and what role its structure played in the Gulf War, the 
opposition to the American assistance and the domestic struggles caused by this. The chapter 
will end with the response of the government to the opposition in the country.  
 
An autocratic rentier state 
Public opinion is mainly shaped by policy makers and autocracies have more tools than 
democracies to control the media and thus what information citizens receive. This does not 
mean that autocratic leaders are in total control of public opinion or are not influenced by 
public opinion. The Middle East has many examples of autocratic leaders being ousted by a 
population, such as the Shah of Iran in 1979 or some Arab leaders during the Arab Spring. 
Therefore, many autocrats are aware that there are limitations to their ability to control the 
people. When there is no democratic framework giving a population room to express their 
ideas, people are more likely to take their grievances to the street. Making sure that the public 
accepts the foreign policy of its country is thus vital to the survival of an authoritarian regime.  
In the Arab world, another dimension is added to the one described above. Many Arabs care 
about what happens to other Arabs. In the case of Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, this was 
one of the main reasons why Saudis opposed the Americans, as they objected to the American 
support for Israel and its occupation of Palestine. When the Saudi government aligned itself 
with the US, it was aligned to a country that in the eyes of many Saudis supported the 
occupation of Palestine.
83
 
Because Saudi Arabia is a rentier state, and follows the principle of ‘no taxation so no 
representation’ it is hard for it to create a big army. The state provides benefits for the 
citizens, and in return it cannot depend on its citizens to join the army and defend the country, 
as that would disturb the social contract between the citizens and the state. Other reasons for 
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Saudi Arabia’s small army is that it does not allow women to join, that minorities hardly ever 
join or get promoted, and that soldiers do not have a very high social status. Saudi Arabia 
had111.500 troops in 1990, including the National Guard, while Iraq was estimated to have 
five times as many troops in that year.
84
 
For the past decades, Saudi Arabia had been able to control its people by paying for their 
loyalty. This social contract between the state and the population worked, because Saudi 
Arabia had a large income thanks to its oil reserves.
85
 However, during the period 1990-1993 
the budget deficit of Saudi Arabia grew from 6.4% of the GDP to 11% of the GDP. The 
country was able to pay its expenditures of the Gulf War off by 1995, but it had to make 
budget cuts to realise this. Saudi Arabia never gave full data on its budget spending during the 
Gulf War, but it is assumed that its fiscal deficit had reached 37 billion dollar during the years 
of the Gulf War, and reached around 10 billion dollar in the 1992.
86
 This meant that the 
Saudis had trouble with fulfilling their end of the bargain of the social contract and therefore, 
they had to give in to some of the demands made by the people.  
The most important reason why Saudi Arabia downplayed their military connection with the 
US in the past had been fear of domestic repercussions. The Al Sauds feared that the arrival of 
the US Army in 1990 would serve as a catalyst for the oppositionists to the regime. They were 
well aware that the American presence could undermine their legitimacy.
87
 The Saudi 
government neglected to inform the public of their motivations for accepting the American 
help, and did not realise that the combination of shrining oil incomes, a higher educated 
population, discontent about the Saudi military policy and a quiet government could lead to 
problems.
88
 As mentioned above, especially within religious circles, people were unhappy 
with the ties that their country had made with America, and this eventually led to a petition 
that denounced these ties. The regime wanted to prevent an uprising by anti-American 
opposition, since it needed the US for their security.
89
 
 
Opposition to the government 
The Americans were not the only one who proposed to protect Saudi Arabia. After the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, Osama bin Laden offered an alternative to the Americans when he 
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presented a plan for the defence of Saudi Arabia to Prince Sultan and Prince Turki. This plan 
was rejected and the Saudis aligned themselves with the Americans. Bin Laden was furious 
and expressed this clearly and openly via speeches distributed on cassette tapes.
90
 After the 
rejection of Osama bin Laden’s help, the Saudi population started to discuss domestic politics 
more openly. This new interest in politics was stimulated by the Al Sauds, because the crisis 
gave way to a big religious movement that opposed the westernisation and secular, mainly 
American culture and the Saudi monarchy. The Al Sauds hoped that more involvement and 
support from the liberal part of Saudi society could help them to remain in power.
91
   
Part of the opposition movement consisted of Islamic militant clerics who, inspired by Osama 
bin Laden, distributed cassette tapes with speeches in which the Americans were denounced 
as occupiers of Saudi Arabia who had been invited in to the country by the government. The 
authorities feared undertaking action against these clerics, as they were scared that it would 
backfire. The speeches also subtly accused the royal family of not being worthy of protecting 
the cities of Mecca and Medina, since they had allowed the hosting of American.
92
 This 
sentiment concerning the Islamic holy cities was shared by many conservative Saudis, mainly 
because the US are not Islamic. Those opposing the US presence felt that the Americans were 
violating the religious prohibition that forbade Jews and Christians to enter in the holy cities 
of Mecca and Medina and felt that this prohibition was breached by Americans being on 
Saudi soil. Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter 2, for most Saudis the fear of Iraqi 
occupation was bigger than their loath for the Americans and there were also many Saudis 
who supported the American’s presence in the kingdom.93 
However, not all opposition was aimed at the Americans and not just the Islamists had 
objections to the monarchy. The liberal, secularist opposition gained attention when they 
reminded the king to a promise he had made in November 1990, when he promised to allow 
the establishment of a consultative council that would look to the possibilities of 
constitutional reform. Saudi Arabia already had a Committee of Senior Scholars, which dealt 
with social questions such as penal and civil law, and with political questions. However, the 
Council backed the Saudi regime almost always on political issues. The liberals called for a 
change of this system and had 43 high-profile Saudis submit several requests for reforms of 
Saudi politics, the judiciary and the administration. The liberals used the opportunity that the 
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Gulf War provided them to ask for a limitation to the power of the Ulama in the judiciary 
system, more media freedom and equal rights for all citizens. The Islamists reacted to these 
demands, and offered petitions of their own to the king.
94
 
The Islamists submitted petitions, letters of demands, and memoranda of advice to the king in 
1991 and 1992. The movement used Friday sermons held at mosques by charismatic, religious 
reformists to mobilise the population. They wanted the foreign armies to leave and an 
extensive, radical reform of the Saudi political system, toward a more Islamic system.
95
 In a 
memorandum of advice, submitted to the king in 1992, they asked for a halt to grants to 
countries like Syria and Egypt, who were in their eyes un-Islamic. They also called for more 
budget for the military, 500.000 troops and more variety in the countries from which the 
kingdom bought arms. They also accused the US of treating Saudi Arabia as a puppet.
96
 
The Islamist movement included many prominent personalities, both laymen and clerics, and 
among them were also well-known members from al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya, which were partly 
organised in the jama’at islamiyya, or Islamic groups. These groups formed networks that 
offered religious education and extracurricular activities that raised Islamic awareness. 
Although the jama’at were very informal, they were also cohesive and used their extensive 
structures to mobilise tens of thousands of Saudi youth. These groups formed a real threat to 
the Saudi regime, and although the Sahwa had never opposed the Saudi regime, some leaders 
would support the Islamist movement in the late 1990’s. Because these groups could rally so 
many people, they managed to play a destabilising role in Saudi Arabia.
97
 
 
Response from the Saudi government 
The Saudi leadership was losing legitimacy, partly because they had to ask the US for 
protection. Right from the start of the Gulf War, King Fahd had to give in to many of the 
demands made by the Saudi people. The war caused much pressure on the monarchy and the 
domestic demonstrations forced King Fahd to announce a reorganisation of his cabinet on 5
 
August, 1990.
98
 By early February 1991, the Saudis felt that the air campaign had been lasting 
too long and they became nervous as they feared that it would help Saddam Hussain gain 
more popularity among Arabs, since he was the one fighting the west. This, the diminishing 
legitimacy of the king, along with the financial burden made the Saudi leadership increasingly 
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eager for the war to come to an end.
99
 
For many Saudis, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 meant more political freedom, as the presence 
of international media in the country forced the government – who feared to lose the support 
of its coalition partners – to allow more liberties to its population. The presence of the western 
press led to a provocation by liberal female Saudis, who exploited this media presence to 
challenge the unofficial ban on women driving cars.
100
 In the beginning of November 1990, 
some fifty women protested against the informal ban by driving their cars through Riyadh. 
Unfortunately for the women, the protest backfired and the Ministry of Interior officialised 
the ban and forbade women to engage in political activity. Both the government and the 
Ulama used this protest as an example for Saudi women of how not to behave and renewed a 
campaign for the promotion of “the image of ideal Islamic womanhood as secluded wife and 
mother”.101  
The government had to answer to demands of the radical clergyman and calm the unrest in 
Saudi society. In order to hold on to their power, the Saudi leadership tried to keep up the 
status quo as good as possible. To please the Ulama, the government could not afford more 
liberties for women and promoted the traditional role reserved for women.
102
 More religious 
education was taught in schools, and the religious authorities were given control of girl 
schools. Also, it was forbidden for women to sing in public or for female singers to be played 
on the radio or television, and the clergy gained a more substantial influence on what would 
be allowed to broadcast on television. In other words, the clergy effectively gained the right to 
censor the media.
103
  
In March 1991, the king announced reforms. New laws were proposed and the central government 
would allow the provinces more autonomy. These reforms would lead to the formation in 1992 of a 
Consultative Council.
104
 Although the king met some of the demands of the liberal opposition, this 
Consultative Council was not elected, and offers high positions mainly to Saudi elites. A Basic System 
of Governance, a constitution-like document, was written, which described the role of the royal 
family. It was “not a real parliament or a real constitution,” but still meant progress from the old 
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situation and according to King Fahd “reflect[ed] changes in the relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled.”105 
The presence of the US Army gave more freedom to Saudis to express their opinion. Forced 
by pressure from both the liberal as well as the Islamist segments in Saudi society, the 
government had to give in to their demands and allow reforms. Because the Islamist 
movement was bigger and better organised than the liberal one, most reforms led to a more 
Islamist society. 
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4. The public opinion of the American population 
 
Previous to the war, most Americans knew little about Saudi Arabia. When reports by the 
media on Saudi women’s rights were published, many Americans started to question their 
partnerships with the kingdom. Along with articles on the ‘Highway of death’, these reports 
published in newspapers managed to alter public opinion in the United States. 
Reasons for going to war 
In the years prior to the Gulf War, the US did not consider the Persian Gulf as a region that 
needed to be high on their priority list.
106
 The Gulf had become a ‘third-order priority’ to the 
US government, but this did not mean that the region had lost its importance. This became 
evident when Kuwait was invaded and Saudi Arabia was under threat. The US had multiple 
reasons to get involved with the war in the Gulf. Keeping both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia safe 
and ensuring a “post-Gulf War order” that was acceptable to the US were important ones, as 
was safeguarding the many oil resources in the region.
107
  
Another reason for going to war was getting rid of the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ that the US was 
still suffering from. By winning a war on the ground against Iraq, the country could shake off 
the feeling of having failed in Vietnam. This feeling had lingered in the air, every time the US 
was thinking about intervening anywhere. The victory in the Gulf reinstated America’s lost 
confidence in its hegemony of the world. When it was clear that Iraq was defeated, President 
Bush stated ‘[b]y God, (…) we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all’. This 
statement expresses the relief that many Americans felt when they could once again be proud 
of their military.
108
 
President Bush drafted his war aims around the status quo prior to the invasion, which meant 
that the boundaries in the region before 2
 
August 1990 were his reference point.
109
 The war 
goals stated by the US shifted as the war went on, because it was important to keep Saddam 
Hussain guessing about the goals of the coalition and they needed to provide war aims that the 
public would support.
110
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The media 
The US government tried to keep the number of casualties as low as possible, as they feared 
that the public would denounce the war if too many images of dead soldiers would reach the 
citizens.
111
 To shelter the public from cruel pictures, journalists were granted only limited 
access on the front. The only way to go to the front for the media corps was by joining an 
authorised visit to the front, under the guidance of army officials. Because there were limited 
places in this visitation pool due to logistical problems, many journalists had to wait for news 
in Saudi Arabia and were only allowed limited days on the front. Journalists felt that this 
system did not work as it infringed upon their means of giving full coverage of the Gulf War, 
and started visiting the front without consent. In reaction to this, the US Army threatened to 
revoke the press credentials of journalists who went to the front without taking part in the 
pool.
112
  
When the war ended, journalists described the pool system as a form of “censorship by which 
limited access allowed the government to control what it wanted the public to know”, 
although few journalists had complained during the war. The military had installed the pool 
system to control the large amounts of journalists in Saudi Arabia, and was indeed to some 
extent able to control what information would be published, but censorship within this system 
was rare.
113
 
Prior to 1990, Saudi Arabia had been rather closed off and few Americans had been there or 
had known much about it. In the trail of the150.000 American soldiers, of whom 15.000 were 
women, followed some 1.500 journalists, who reported on the war and on what was going on 
in Saudi Arabia for the Americans at home.
114
 The coverage of the war by western media put 
an emphasis on the role of the monarchy in Saudi Arabia. They explicitly described persons 
that were part of both the authorities and the royal family with all their titles, to emphasise the 
image of Saudi Arabia as an absolute monarchy.
115
 A quotation in the New York Times 
underlines this: “[y]ou cannot distinguish between the House of Saud and the Saudi State; 
they are interwoven.” This shaped the opinion of common Americans whose knowledge on 
Saudi Arabia was often poor, and who learned about Saudi authoritarianism through the 
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media.
116
 
Western journalists also focussed on the gender inequality that prevailed in Saudi Arabia. An 
article in the New York Times mentioned a female American officer who had Saudi soldiers 
under her command who were not aware that women could have the authority to give orders. 
The soldiers experienced a culture shock when they learned that the woman was their officer. 
Such descriptions of events in the American media contributed to the image that Americans 
formed of Saudi Arabia.
117
 Many American soldiers “were shocked at the way American 
servicewomen were treated by their Saudi allies and the second-class status of Saudi women 
throughout the country.” Also Americans at home were appalled by the way females were 
treated in Saudi Arabia and some labelled it as “gender apartheid”. The focus on women’s 
issues in Saudi Arabia shaped the way that the Gulf War was experienced in the US by the 
American people and made it “part of the US public consciousness about the war”.   
The many Western journalists staying in the country covered eagerly on the women protesting 
the driving ban and wrote about the women full of admiration and of their “daring defiance”. 
The articles often discussed the “prospects for liberal reforms in the Islamic country” and 
spoke out their hopes on reform and their support for the women when they were arrested. By 
using such descriptions, the journalists transferred an image to the American public of Saudi 
Arabia as a “xenophobic and theocratically Islamic country”.118 
Women in Saudi Arabia 
The Americans struggled with the way another country treated its women. The Saudis on the 
other hand were shocked to see the role of women in American society.
119
 It was 
incomprehensible to some Saudi citizens, that the US let women serve in their army and had 
them carry weapons and drive cars. Even more incomprehensible was the fact that women and 
men worked together and that women even had leadership positions senior to men. The Saudi 
government tried to set limitations on what female soldiers were allowed to do, something 
that angered many American women serving in the US Army. These restrictions involved 
women driving and dressing. The former meant that women were never allowed to drive cars, 
and they were only allowed to drive military vehicles when on duty, leading to female 
American soldiers having to be driven around when they were not working. The latter meant 
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that although American servicewomen did not need to cover their faces, they had to wear long 
sleeves and trousers, a demand not made of their male colleagues. The US Army obliged to 
these demands to show good will and respect for Saudi culture.
120
 
To make their time in Saudi Arabia useful, many journalists tried to search for stories within 
the kingdom. Not just female soldiers, also female journalists faced restrictions which they 
were not used to. As this irritated many of them, it was an issue reported about a lot and thus 
reached the Americans at home. There was much demand in the US for news items on women 
serving in the US Army in Saudi Arabia. This contributed to the popular protests in the US, as 
people felt they were fighting for a country that saw women as inferior. Stories about 
American journalists, dressed in the obligated Islamic dress, being beaten by the vice police 
reached the States. However, there were also articles about women going to the supermarket 
in their uniform, walking between local Saudi women in their abayas without a problem. 
These articles gave the “overall impression that Saudi Arabia oppressed women and that the 
presence of liberated American women in uniform might be a much-needed shock to this 
ultra-conservative society.”121 
All this information on the position of women in Saudi society made Americans in the US 
question the basis for the American-Saudi alliance. Common Americans, along with 
journalists, scholars and soldiers, raised a concern for and argued in favour of the integration 
of women’s rights in the foreign policy of the US, especially in relation to Muslims countries. 
This public evolvement and the call for attention for the rights of women in Islamic countries 
was new to American politics but continued after the Gulf War had ended. Although the war 
did not last long enough to implement changes, and thus had little influence on America’s 
relation with Saudi Arabia, as a result of the war coverage, women’s rights became a big issue 
in American foreign policy. Ever since the Gulf War, the US has tried to advocate for the 
rights of Muslimas in Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia.
122
 
Support in the United States 
An oversight of combined polls shows that approval of “President Bush’s decision to send 
troops to help defend Saudi Arabia” was 86% on 21 August 1990. Support for the way 
President Bush handled the situation in the Middle East with regards and his efforts in the war 
against Iraq had been 78% in September 1990, but had diminished to 61% on 15 January 
                                                          
120
 Shannon, "‘I'm Glad I'm Not a Saudi Woman’," 553-561. 
121
 Shannon, "‘I'm Glad I'm Not a Saudi Woman’," 562-564. 
122
 Shannon, "‘I'm Glad I'm Not a Saudi Woman’," 553-569. 
1991.
123
 Whether the US should help Saudi Arabia was a bigger question than whether they 
should liberate Kuwait. Even though many Americans saw Saddam Hussain as an 
“embodiment of evil”, they were not willing to go to war over him. Reason for this 
unwillingness among Americans was partly the Vietnam Syndrome – taking part in a 
seemingly never-ending war -, pacifism and isolationism. This was no issue during Operation 
Desert Shield, which was a defensive operation that would not necessarily end in war, but 
when the situation became more serious and the operation shifted toward a more offensive 
strategy, more opposition arose. However, when Operation Desert Storm started, this 
opposition quickly dissolved into thin air.
124
  
 
Highway of death 
On 26
 
February 1992, while the attacks on fleeing Iraqis – mentioned in chapter 1 – were still 
going on, the Pentagon tried to deny that these events on the ‘Highway of death’ were 
happening at a press conference. The same day however, an American pilot told a media pool 
reporter that shooting the Iraqis was like “shooting fish in a barrel”, while other journalists 
reported of bombing missions taking place over the highway, indicating that the Pentagon had 
knowingly lied during its press conference that morning.  
The Iraqi radio announced that the government had told Iraqi soldiers on the night of 25 
February to withdraw, which made the coalition attacks seem like “a one-sided slaughter of 
retreating Iraqi troops”, as the US Army must had heard the radio message and thus knew 
about the withdrawal. However, the Americans tried to frame it as though the message only 
told the Iraqis to leave their military equipment, and later on as though the Iraqis were not 
retreating but continued fighting while being forced out of Kuwait by the coalition forces. 
President Bush gave a speech in which he emphasised that the Iraqis were retreating under 
pressure, not withdrawing on their own, which made all the difference to the military and 
would thus allow the coalition forces to pursue the Iraqi soldiers.
125
  
In the meanwhile, the US Army tried to propagate the Gulf War as a war of smart bombs and 
few civilian casualties. When images of the ’Highway of death’ reached the public, this 
carefully constructed picture was shattered, since “its images of wreckage and death 
contrasting sharply with emotionally remote "smart bomb" videotapes and television pool 
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reports filmed from the rear of the desert battlefield.”126 The American leadership had tried 
very hard to establish an “image of a ‘clean’ and unblemished victory”, but this ‘turkey 
shooting’ of Iraqi soldiers shocked the international community and heavily weakened this 
image. After this incident, the President faced pressure from both domestic and international 
actors to end the war.
127
 
Despite the size of the damage on the ‘Highway of death’, only limited footage of it reached 
the American public, despite the field day that journalists had toward the side. Most images 
show abandoned vehicles and few bodies, with the exception of one photo by Kenneth 
Jarecke which shows a dead Iraqi soldier with his upper body burned. This picture was the 
“most vivid and publicly damaging” and helped shape the American public’s image of the 
‘Highway of death’ as a turkey shooting, despite the limited casualties that had been 
sustained.
128
 Nevertheless, the public was not really affected by the pictures as much as the 
American government had expected. Words written in news articles seemed to affect their 
opinion on the Gulf War more than images, and the public did not seem to mind a few 
casualties when it meant a positive outcome of the war.
 
The public wanted to know about the 
war, but they did not want the media to be too critical.
129
 The war “revealed some interesting 
causal relations connecting the media, military and political elites, security policy, and the 
public.”130 
After the war, the American public was more supportive of the media than it had been before 
the war. They applauded the way that reporters had written on American soldiers and 
“appreciated the patriotism and respect” given to them by the media. The government had 
used the media to send the message about the war that they wanted to be heard by the public. 
However, most people at home were not aware that they not always were given all 
information and trusted the press corps to give them objective complete information on the 
Gulf War.
131
 
Many American newspapers wrote about the Gulf War, and apart from what happened on the 
battleground, many articles were on authoritarianism and women’s rights in Saudi society. 
This made many Americans – of whom many had known little about Saudi Arabia prior to the 
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war – question their alliance to the kingdom. Also, reports on the ‘Highway of death’ caused 
much upheaval, but in the end, most Americans primarily cared about the victory in Iraq and 
not about Iraqi casualties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis looked at the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States during the 
Gulf War of 1990-1991 and how this has changed after the war ended. Special attention was 
given to the role of the media and public opinion in both Saudi Arabia and the United States. 
Prior to the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the US and Saudi Arabia had a good relationship, which 
was primarily based on the defence of Saudi Arabia, the containment of the Middle East and 
securing Saudi Arabia’s oil. Due to the social structure of Saudi society, the country was 
unable to build a large army. However, they still needed security and in order to realize this, a 
military partnership with the US was established. This was profitable for the US as they 
wanted overseas access to oil and for Saudi Arabia because they enjoyed US security 
guarantees. 
Although the Cold War was over by the time the Gulf War began, all the other reasons to help 
Saudi Arabia were still important for the US by August 1990. Therefore, the US was more 
than willing to set up a coalition that could liberate Kuwait and defend Saudi Arabia from 
Iraqi forces. The kingdom allowed the US Army to enter the country, something they had 
never allowed prior to the war. As the war progressed, the military relationship intensified and 
this led to an arms deal when the war had ended. 
Within Saudi Arabia, the Gulf War led to opposition to the regime. Out of fear that the 
coalition would forsake its help, the government allowed more political freedom. Many 
groups used this opportunity to call for reforms and both liberalist and Islamist groups 
demanded change. Because the kingdom has lost some of its legitimacy due to its alliance to 
the United States and had to deal with financial troubles caused by the war, the Al Sauds gave 
in to some of the demands. The Islamist were a bigger and better organized group than the 
liberalists, and therefore the Saudi leadership answered to most of their demands, leading to 
more power for the clergy and more emphasis on women as housewives. 
The media had a big influence on the way people in the US looked at Saudi Arabia. Although 
people barely knew the country prior to the war, when it ended most people knew about the 
prevalent authoritarianism and the lack of women’s rights within the kingdom. For many, the 
latter was a reason to question the alliance of the US with the country, even though most 
people did not oppose the war. Because the war did not last that long, the government did not 
have the time to act on pressure from Americans to take women’s rights in Saudi Arabia more 
seriously. In the long run, these rights became part of the foreign policy of the US, also when 
dealing with Saudi Arabia. 
Although the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US at the end of the Gulf War was 
still good, and from a militarily perspective even better than in July 1990, it did undergo some 
changes. Prior to the war, the only Americans who concerned themselves with Saudi Arabia 
were businessmen, consultants, diplomats and politicians, while after the war many more 
people took interest in the country. Ordinary people, as well as journalists and feminist groups 
made the government change its foreign policy toward Muslim countries, including Saudi 
Arabia, as women’s right became a major focus. 
Except for this addition to the relation between the countries and the improvement of their 
military relationship, it seems that the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US was not 
changed much by the Gulf War of 1990-1991. There were no major changes in approaches to 
another, and no significant shifts in diplomacy, policy or politics. 
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